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MURPHY V. ROYAL: CRIME AND PROCEDURE
Kevin Cartwright*
Introduction
A man was killed in McIntosh County, Oklahoma, in August of 1999,
kicking off nearly two decades of incorrect or incomplete judicial decisions.
In April of 2000, Muscogee Creek citizen Patrick Dwayne Murphy was
convicted of capital murder for this killing and sentenced to death after a
jury trial.1 As of this writing, Murphy remains in the custody of the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections.2 In the intervening eighteen years,
Murphy and his attorneys have continually appealed his conviction. He
applied twice for post-conviction relief in state court, twice for writs of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and twice for habeas relief in
federal district court.3 In his brushes with the courts, Murphy twice acted as
an unwitting test case. Following the United States Supreme Court’s
landmark Atkins v. Virginia decision, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals (“OCCA”) used Murphy’s appeal for post-conviction relief to set
forth the standard Oklahoma would apply to determine the mental capacity
of defendants in capital cases. More recently, Murphy’s second appeal in
federal court led to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision Murphy v.
Royal. This case reemphasized the federal courts’ delineation of Indian
reservation boundaries and applied that framework to the unique situation
of Indian tribes in Oklahoma. The circuit panel held that only the federal
government, rather than the State of Oklahoma, had jurisdiction to try
Murphy for the murder.4 The Tenth Circuit then ordered the district court
below to grant Murphy’s request for habeas relief. 5
The shortsightedness of Murphy v. Royal stems from the panel only
considering jurisdiction while ignoring more substantive claims. The
procedural posture leading to Murphy v. Royal is convoluted, but Judge
Matheson summarized every step in his opinion for the court.6 The opinion
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Murphy v. Royal (Royal I), 866 F.3d 1164, 1173 (10th Cir. 2017).
2. Murphy’s continued custody in the Oklahoma Department of Corrections can be
verified via a name search at OKLA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS: OK OFFENDER, https://
okoffender.doc.ok.gov (last visited Aug. 13, 2018).
3. Royal I, 866 F.3d at 1173–78.
4. Id. at 1233.
5. Id. at 1178 n.16.
6. Id. at 1173–78.
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illustrates the court’s understanding of the number of hours and tribunals
previously invested in the proceedings. The federal district and circuit
courts granted Murphy certificates of appealability—a prerequisite for
federal circuit courts to exercise jurisdiction over an appeal—on eight
different issues.7 The Tenth Circuit could have decided issues concerning
$

prosecutorial jurisdiction;

$

Oklahoma’s treatment of Murphy’s Atkins claim;

$

the aggravating circumstances that contributed to a death
sentence;

$

the admissibility of victim-impact statements;

$

jury instructions;

$

procedural fumbling by the federal district court;

$

ineffective assistance of counsel; and

$

cumulative error.8

Yet the panel ruled solely on the issue of jurisdiction, bypassing the
remaining issues entirely. 9
The panel’s disinterest in considering Murphy’s Atkins claim is
disappointing for many reasons. To begin, a decision from the Tenth Circuit
regarding how Oklahoma tests for mental capacity of defendants in capital
cases would be useful for the State and all defendants in future proceedings.
Furthermore, the panel knew of Murphy’s numerous appeals prior to 2017,
several of which referenced Atkins. An Atkins ruling would therefore have
general utility while addressing a near-perennial claim of the party at hand.
Finally, Murphy pinballed throughout the court system for eighteen years
between his first conviction and Murphy v. Royal. His death sentence has
neither been carried out nor commuted, and now the State of Oklahoma has
taken its case to the Supreme Court.10 While Murphy’s request of habeas
has been granted, his ordeal is far from over. The Supreme Court could
reverse and remand on the matter of jurisdiction, returning the case to the
Tenth Circuit to weigh Murphy’s other appeals. Given the panel’s
knowledge of the issue and the general principles of equity and judicial
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 1178 n.16.
Id.
Id.
See Royal v. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 2026 (2018).
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efficiency, the Tenth Circuit should have considered Murphy’s Atkins
claim.
This Note will touch on the history and jurisdictional holding of the
Murphy v. Royal decision and will then examine Murphy’s Atkins claim and
offer alternatives to Oklahoma’s system. Part I will address pieces of
legislation pertinent to the procedural posture of Murphy v. Royal. Part II
will delve into the factual and procedural background that occurred from
1999 to 2017, which led to this case appearing before the Tenth Circuit.
Part III will review the panel’s analysis in reaching its conclusions
regarding jurisdiction. Part IV will examine Oklahoma’s approach to
mental retardation and the death penalty post-Atkins. Part V will discuss the
implications resulting from the Murphy v. Royal decision. Part VI will offer
alternative criteria courts could rely on when determining an individual’s
eligibility for the death penalty upon raising an Atkins challenge.
I. Relevant Legislation
A. Major Crimes Act
In 1883, the United States Supreme Court held that “federal and
territorial courts lacked jurisdiction to try an Indian for the murder of
another Indian committed in Indian country.”11 Congress responded with
the Major Crimes Act in 1885.12 In its current form, the Act grants the
federal government exclusive jurisdiction over murder and other
enumerated crimes when perpetrated by a Native American within Indian
Country. 13 Later additions to the Act go on to delineate the extents of Indian
Country, namely that the term means
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same. 14
11.
12.
13.
14.

Royal I, 866 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883)).
Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2018).
Id. § 1151.
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The Major Crimes Act sets up the jurisdictional conflict resolved in
Murphy v. Royal so many years later. A Native American man committed
murder. If the murder occurred in Indian Country, the federal government
had the sole authority to prosecute him for the crime. If the murder occurred
outside of Indian Country, the State of Oklahoma had the authority to
prosecute. Acting under the assumption that Murphy was not in Indian
Country when he committed murder, Oklahoma prosecuted and convicted
him. Murphy’s jurisdictional appeal to the federal government basically
alleged that Oklahoma held Murphy in custody inappropriately.
B. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 15
enacted in 1996, resulted in sweeping changes to existing habeas corpus
practice in the federal courts. The primary purpose of the law was twofold.
First, the statute intended to provide a “comprehensive approach to fighting
terrorism both at home and abroad.”16 Second, the act intended to pare
down the appeals process for capital convicts on death row. 17 For any case
arising out of state court, a federal judge first has to issue a certificate of
appealability to allow a federal court of appeals to rule on the appeal’s
merits.18 A court can only grant the certificate if the “applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”19 Barriers are
further cemented in the AEDPA by prohibiting federal district courts from
issuing writs of habeas for claims arising in state court.20 An exception to
this bar exists if the state court violates or unreasonably applies federal
law. 21
AEDPA is relevant to the Murphy decision as it presented two hurdles
the applicant needed to overcome before the panel could proceed to the
merits of the appeal. As a threshold matter, Murphy needed to show with
substantiality that he had been denied a constitutional right in his state court
proceeding. To win on a habeas claim, Murphy additionally had to prove
that Oklahoma violated or unreasonably applied federal law.
15. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18,
22, 28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.)
16. Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 1
PUB. PAPERS 630, 630 (Apr. 24, 1996), 1996 WL 203049.
17. Id. at 631.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2018).
19. Id. § 2253(c)(2).
20. Id. § 2254(d).
21. Id. § 2254 (d)(1).
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II. Factual and Procedural History
The facts surrounding the murder in Murphy point to jealousy over a
perceived love triangle. In 1999, Patrick Dwayne Murphy resided with
Patsy Jacobs.22 Ms. Jacobs previously lived with the victim, George Jacobs,
took his last name, and had a child with him. 23 A few days prior to the
events of August 28 of that year, Murphy and Ms. Jacobs argued about Mr.
Jacobs, and Murphy stated that he would “get Jacobs and his family one by
one.”24
On August 28, Jacobs drank heavily with his cousin. 25 Around 9:30 that
night, Murphy and Jacobs traveled as passengers in separate vehicles going
in opposite directions down a rural road in McIntosh County, Oklahoma. 26
At the time, Jacobs was passed out in the back of his truck while his cousin
drove. 27 The vehicle that Murphy was riding in turned around and followed
the vehicle that Jacobs was in, ultimately forcing that vehicle to stop. 28
Murphy and two other individuals emerged from their vehicle, dragged
Jacobs from the truck, and began beating Jacobs and his cousin. 29 Jacobs’s
cousin was able to flee briefly into the woods surrounding the road. 30
Returning a few minutes later, Jacobs’s cousin found Jacobs “barely
breathing.”31 Shortly before, Jacobs’s cousin witnessed Murphy throw a
knife into the woods. 32 Murphy then forced Jacobs’s cousin to leave with
him and his accomplices.33 A passerby happened upon the scene and left to
phone the police.34 Returning a few minutes later, he found Jacobs
breathing shallowly and observed that his genitals had been cut off and his
neck had been slashed. 35 Jacobs died from the resulting blood loss.36 The

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Murphy v. State (Murphy I), 2002 OK CR 24, ¶ 2, 47 P.3d 876, 879.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3, 47 P.3d at 879.
Id. ¶ 4, 47 P.3d at 879.
Id. ¶ 3, 47 P.3d at 879.
Id. ¶ 5, 47 P.3d at 879.
Id. ¶¶ 5–6, 47 P.3d at 879-80.
Id. ¶ 7, 47 P.3d at 880.
Id. ¶ 9, 47 P.3d at 880.
Id. ¶ 8, 47 P.3d at 880.
Id. ¶ 10, 47 P.3d at 880.
Id. ¶ 9, 47 P.3d at 880.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 9, 15, 47 P.3d at 880.
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confrontation leading to Jacobs’s death was corroborated by Murphy’s own
boasting to Jacobs’s cousin and to multiple other witnesses. 37
Murphy and his associates then tried to harm George Jacobs’s son but
were prevented by the mother of one of Murphy’s accomplices.38 That
night, Murphy admitted his actions to Patsy Jacobs.39 In 2000, Murphy was
convicted for the murder of Jacobs in a jury trial. 40 The jury then sentenced
Murphy to death because it found the murder and castration to be
particularly heinous. 41 Additionally, the jury believed Murphy to be a
continuing threat, given his threats and attempt to harm Jacobs’s minor son
and other family members.42
The OCCA heard Murphy’s direct appeal of his conviction in May of
2002. Murphy raised arguments relating to voir dire, as well as the trial and
sentencing stages of his trial, all of which failed to convince the court to
reverse or remand his conviction. 43 In September of 2002, the OCCA
convened again and issued an opinion on Murphy’s application for postconviction relief. The OCCA rejected almost all of Murphy’s arguments. 44
However, in accordance with the recent Atkins v. Virginia decision, the
OCCA remanded to the district court.45 The OCCA instructed the district
court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Murphy could
put before the jury the question of his mental capacity for purposes of
resentencing.46
Murphy became the test case in Oklahoma for capital sentencing when a
defendant claims mental retardation. The OCCA found itself in the position
of creating state guidelines while the legislature and governor attempted to
compromise and enact legislation concerning the issue.47 Murphy had been
unable to bring this claim on direct appeal, which was decided prior to the
Atkins ruling, despite Murphy’s request that his application be held in
abeyance pending a decision.48 Murphy was uniquely positioned in a postconviction application for relief at the time the OCCA established rules for
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 47 P.3d at 880.
Id. ¶ 12, 47 P.3d at 880.
Id. ¶ 13, 47 P.3d at 880.
Royal I, 866 F.3d 1164, 1173 (10th Cir. 2017).
Murphy I, 2002 OK CR 24, ¶ 1, 47 P.3d at 879.
Id.
Id. ¶ 64, 47 P.3d at 888.
Murphy v. State (Murphy II), 2002 OK CR 32, ¶¶ 37–38, 54 P.3d 556, 569-70.
Id. ¶¶ 37, 39, 54 P.3d at 569-70.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 26-36, 54 P.3d at 566-69.
See id. ¶¶ 29-31, 54 P.3d at 567-68.
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Oklahoma to evaluate Atkins claims.49 For this reason, the majority of the
OCCA in 2005 found it appropriate to put Murphy’s Atkins claim in front
of a jury. 50 This decision was in spite of the district court previously finding
Murphy’s evidence of mental retardation insufficient to warrant a trial and
the OCCA affirming the district court’s finding in 2003.51
Murphy’s post-conviction application to the OCCA in 2005 was also the
only time any form of jurisdictional question in Murphy’s case was
addressed in state court. Prior to the written opinion, the OCCA ordered an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Jacobs’s murder occurred in
Indian Country.52 Such a determination would preclude state jurisdiction in
accordance with the Major Crimes Act. 53 Both parties largely argued
whether the crime had occurred on an Indian allotment, per the wording in
18 U.S.C. § 1151(c).54 With respect to this question, the panel of judges
holding the evidentiary hearing determined that all surface rights and
eleven-twelfths of the mineral rights at the site of the murder had passed on
to non-Indian owners.55 In its view, the remaining one-twelfth mineral
interest retained by Indian owners was insufficient to preserve federal
jurisdiction.56
Whether the murder occurred on an Indian reservation or in a dependent
Indian community, however, was largely left unaddressed in the hearing.
The OCCA considered this oversight a harmless omission based on a
reading of Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma.57 It is this reading the
Tenth Circuit ultimately found contrary to Solem v. Bartlett and the test to
determine the extent of Indian reservations. 58 This erroneous application by
the OCCA opened the door for the Murphy v. Royal decision. Ultimately,
the Tenth Circuit held the federal government had jurisdiction under 18
U.S.C. § 1151(a) to prosecute Murphy. 59 The location of the murder
occurred within the limits of the Creek Nation Indian Reservation as
49. Murphy v. State (Murphy III), 2005 OK CR 25, ¶ 56 n.21, 124 P.3d 1198, 1208
n.21.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. ¶¶ 11-19, 124 P.3d at 1201-02.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2018).
54. Murphy III, 2005 OK CR 25, ¶¶ 10-11, 124 P.3d at 1200-01.
55. Id. ¶ 18, 124 P.3d at 1201-02.
56. Id. ¶¶ 34, 41-46, 124 P.3d at 1205, 1206-07.
57. Id. ¶¶ 50-52, 124 P.3d at 1207-08 (citing Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma,
829 F.2d 967, 975 (10th Cir. 1987)).
58. Royal I, 866 F.3d 1164, 1193–94 (10th Cir. 2017).
59. Id. at 1233.
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established by the federal government in 1866.60 And vitally, the limits of
the reservation were never disestablished. 61
Meanwhile, Murphy’s Atkins appeal continued in state court. In 2009, a
jury found that Murphy was not mentally retarded, but the verdict was
thrown out and a new trial scheduled because of errors in the voir dire
process.62 Before that new trial commenced, the district court granted
Oklahoma’s motion to apply Murphy’s claim to the new statutory rubric
finally enacted by the State in 2006.63 One provision in the law provided
that individuals could not pursue a mental retardation claim if they scored a
76 or greater on an intelligence quotient (“IQ”) examination.64 The effect of
this statute in the instant case was that it barred Murphy from continuing his
Atkins claim due to scores he had received on IQ tests taken during the trial
process.65 In the most recent Murphy decision reached by the OCCA in
2012, the court held that such a statutory provision did not create an ex post
facto law or punishment.66 The court denied Murphy another jury trial to
determine whether he was mentally retarded, again based on his
exclusionary test scores. 67
The OCCA is the court of last resort for criminal matters in the State of
Oklahoma. Thus, the procedural history is peppered with collateral habeas
appeals to the District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma and the
Tenth Circuit, as well as writs of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court. The federal district court heard two appeals prior to the Tenth Circuit
issuing its ruling on jurisdiction. Murphy v. Sirmons in 2007 only briefly
acknowledged the jurisdictional issue.68 Murphy v. Trammell in 2015 gave
a deeper treatment to Murphy’s Atkins claim, including more recent case
law, like Hall v. Florida.69 At all points in the proceedings, the named
defendant was the warden of the state correctional facility where Murphy
was incarcerated, but the Oklahoma Attorney General’s office argued and
wrote on the briefs in all cases.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Murphy v. State (Murphy IV), 2012 OK CR 8, ¶ 3, 281 P.3d 1283, 1287.
63. Id. ¶ 4, 281 P.3d at 1287.
64. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.10b (2011).
65. Murphy IV, 2012 OK CR 8, ¶ 38, 281 P.3d at 1293.
66. Id. ¶ 46, 281 P.3d at 1294.
67. Id. ¶ 47, 281 P.3d at 1294.
68. Murphy v. Sirmons, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (E.D. Okla. 2007).
69. Murphy v. Trammell, No. CIV–12–191–RAW–KEW, 2015 WL 2094548 (E.D.
Okla. May 5, 2015).
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III. Murphy v. Royal
The jurisdictional issue addressed by the Tenth Circuit is nuanced, yet
straightforward in comparison to the history of the case heretofore. The
Major Crimes Act grants the federal government jurisdiction over murder
and certain other criminal acts perpetrated by Native Americans while in
Indian Country. 70 Murphy’s membership in the Muscogee Creek Nation
was undisputed, so the issue presented was whether the location of the
murder constituted Indian country. 71 The panel explained this notion
succinctly, stating:
Congress has defined Indian country broadly to include three
categories of areas: (a) Indian reservations, (b) dependent Indian
communities, and (c) Indian allotments. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
The reservation clause concerns us here. All land within the
borders of an Indian reservation—regardless of whether the
tribe, individual Indians, or non-Indians hold title to a given tract
of land—is Indian country unless Congress has disestablished
the reservation or diminished its borders. 72
Having established an Indian reservation, only Congress had the power
to disestablish or diminish it.73 The standard for determining whether
Congress disestablished or diminished a reservation has been proffered by
the Supreme Court, and proof of disestablishment or diminishment is
difficult to show without direct evidence of congressional intent. 74 In short,
Oklahoma failed to show with sufficient indirect evidence that Congress
intended to diminish the Muscogee Creek Reservation.75 Despite occurring
on land that no longer belonged to tribal members, the location of the
murder was within the previously established and unchanged boundaries of
the reservation.76 Therefore, state jurisdiction was improper. 77
To reach the jurisdictional question, the Tenth Circuit first had to
determine if its jurisdiction was appropriate under the AEDPA. 78 Normally,
AEDPA would prohibit the federal government from granting habeas relief
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2018).
Royal I, 866 F.3d 1164, 1175 (10th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1185–88.
Id. at 1205.
Id. at 1233.
Id.
Id. at 1192.
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over a state’s adjudication of a claim on its merits. 79 But this prohibition is
ineffective when the state’s decision is contrary to any federal laws clearly
established by the Supreme Court.80
After dispensing with the question of whether the circuit panel could
consider the appeal, the panel could then turn to the history of the Major
Crimes Act.81 This piece of legislation informed the Supreme Court’s
understanding of Indian Country, including reservations. Notably, the Tenth
Circuit cited to United States v. Celestine and Solem v. Bartlett for its
understanding of the boundaries of an Indian reservation. 82 These cases held
that reservations were extant regardless of who owned particular parcels of
land within the boundaries.83
Finally, the circuit panel referenced Supreme Court decisions holding
that Congress alone had the power to disestablish or diminish Indian
reservations.84 This section of the opinion was broken down further, noting
that there existed a longstanding presumption against disestablishment and
diminishment of reservations. 85 The court also addressed in particularity the
fact that the act of allotment alone was insufficient evidence of Congress’s
intent to disestablish or diminish a reservation. 86
Much of the remainder of the opinion dealt with the current test from
Solem v. Bartlett for determining whether Congress intended to disestablish
or diminish an extant Indian reservation. The three-pronged Solem test
requires courts to first analyze the primary text of any document purporting
to disestablish or diminish a reservation. 87 Prongs two and three require the
court to consider events concurrent in time with the passage of a statute,
and to a lesser extent, those events occurring subsequent to the passage of a
statute.88 Solem is a balancing test, with each prong carrying decreasing
evidentiary weight. Additionally, ambiguities that crop up during the
analysis should be resolved in the tribe’s favor, a rule which must be given
wide latitude.89

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1182-83.
Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id. at 1185–88.
Id. at 1185-86.
Id. at 1186.
Id. at 1187-88.
Id. at 1188.
Id.
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After describing the prongs of the Solem test, the Tenth Circuit applied
the law to the facts pertinent to Murphy and Oklahoma. Solem was the law
of the land long before the murder of Jacobs, and decisions by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals were contrary to the Solem
decision.90 These state decisions, contrary to established federal law,
granted the Tenth Circuit jurisdiction to review Murphy’s appeal. 91 The
court inspected the text of several documents that the State pointed to as
evidence that the Muscogee Creek reservation was diminished at least
beyond the location of the murder. 92 The panel concluded there was no
textual language supporting the State’s position and proceeded to the
secondary and tertiary prongs of the Solem test.93
Within the second prong of the Solem test, the Tenth Circuit found
mixed evidence that Congress intended to disestablish or diminish the
Creek reservation, falling short of explicit statutory language. 94 This mixed
evidence, however, was insufficient to abrogate a reservation according to
the test, which requires unequivocal evidence of understood congressional
intent.95 Subsequent history of the land also both supported and opposed
diminishment or disestablishment of the reservation. 96 Such mixed evidence
was again insufficient to overcome any presumption against diminishment
or disestablishment.97 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit held that the
Muscogee Creek Reservation encompassed the location of the murder,
making solely federal jurisdiction appropriate for prosecutorial purposes. 98
IV. Atkins v. Virginia
In 2002, the Supreme Court declared it a violation of the Eighth
Amendment to execute individuals with mental retardation, overturning its
previous decision from 1989.99 This ruling provided guidance derived from
the American Association on Mental Retardation (now known as the

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 1193–95.
Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1206-18.
Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1221.
Id.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1233.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities). 100
However, the Court left it to states to implement the Atkins ruling within the
framework of existing criminal justice systems. 101 During the timeframe of
Murphy’s appeals, two consecutive sets of criteria existed in the State of
Oklahoma for determining the merits of defendants’ Atkins claims in capital
cases.
The first system was established by the OCCA during Murphy’s first
appeal for post-conviction relief.102 The rubric was to be implemented only
as a placeholder until the state legislature and governor enacted statutory
provisions for such appeals.103 In fact, the OCCA claimed it based its
procedure primarily on legislation passed by both state houses but vetoed
by the governor.104 The framework established by the OCCA was
superseded in 2006 when Oklahoma legislators passed a statute, but the
statute was not applied to Murphy until after his jury trial in 2009. 105 Of
note, the section provides that
in no event shall a defendant who has received an intelligence
quotient of seventy-six (76) or above on any individually
administered, scientifically recognized, standardized intelligence
quotient test administered by a licensed psychiatrist or
psychologist, be considered mentally retarded and, thus, shall not
be subject to any proceedings under this section. 106
Due to multiple IQ test scores above this threshold, Murphy could not
further pursue his Atkins claim in state court.107
Between the denial of Murphy’s second post-conviction relief appeal
before the OCCA in 2012 and the opinion in his second federal habeas
appeal in 2015, the Supreme Court decided Hall v. Florida.108 Florida, like
Oklahoma and other states attempting to implement Atkins, established its
own state procedures to vet Atkins claims in capital cases.109 Unlike
100. See Use of Mental Retardation on this Website, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/historical-context (last
visited Mar. 2, 2018).
101. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
102. Murphy II, 2002 OK CR 32, ¶ 30, 54 P.3d 556, 567.
103. Id.
104. Id. ¶¶ 29-31, 54 P.3d at 567-68.
105. Murphy IV, 2012 OK CR 8, ¶ 4, 281 P.3d 1283, 1287.
106. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.10b (2011).
107. Murphy IV, 2012 OK CR 8, ¶ 38, 281 P.3d at 1293.
108. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
109. Id. at 1992.
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Oklahoma, Florida set a threshold bar on such claims at an IQ of 71 or
higher, construing the Court’s advice in Atkins narrowly.110 Here, though,
the Court rejected Florida’s system as unconstitutional because it did not
allow for any measurement errors common to all forms of IQ tests. 111 The
Court, however, specifically declined to consider whether states that
allowed for measurement error could constitutionally set some higher IQ
ceiling on claims. 112 The federal district court in Murphy v. Trammell
considered Hall v. Florida in its ruling, but did not disturb Oklahoma’s
statutory provision.113 It was well within the federal district court’s power
to have done so, however, and it was within this panel’s discretion to
review Hall as well as the district court’s application of the law.
V. Implications
The ruling in Murphy v. Royal has potentially sweeping implications.
Construing the extent of Indian reservations broadly has particularly wide
consequences in Oklahoma. Much of the eastern half of the state once fit
the definition of traditional Indian Country by way of reservation, if not
dependent community or allotment. Other defendants in capital and felony
cases have already begun filing motions challenging state jurisdiction. 114
Certainly, this will be an argument that defense attorneys may raise for all
future major crimes perpetrated by Native American individuals in Indian
Country. This seems to be one of the concerns alluded to in the
concurrence.115 Chief Judge Tymkovich implies that the Supreme Court
might want to act specific to Oklahoma, given the unparalleled prevalence
of Indian reservations in the state. 116
Beyond the Major Crimes Act, many other pieces of federal and state
legislation may need reconsideration if originally enacted with incorrect
assumptions about the extent of reservations. One frequent hypothetical is
whether the entirety of Eastern Oklahoma, including the Tulsa metropolitan

110. Id.
111. Id. at 2001.
112. Id. at 1996.
113. Murphy v. Trammell, No. CIV–12–191–RAW–KEW, 2015 WL 2094548 (E.D.
Okla. May 5, 2015).
114. See Kincaid v. Bear, No. CIV-1117-F, 2017 WL 5560424 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 8,
2017), dismissed on other grounds.
115. See Murphy v. Royal (Royal II), 875 F.3d 896, 966–68 (10th Cir. 2017).
116. Id.
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area, will now be more accessible for the development of Indian gaming. 117
Given the resources required to develop property for gaming, many tribes
will no doubt be waiting to see how the Supreme Court rules on this
jurisdictional issue.
Such implications for casinos and other developments obviously do not
impact Murphy directly as a defendant, but his position is also worth
considering. If the decision stands, Murphy is much less likely to be
executed simply because the jurisdiction of criminal prosecution changed
from state to federal. Even if the federal government chooses to prosecute,
the government has only executed three individuals since reinstating the
federal death penalty in 1988.118 If federal rather than Oklahoma criminal
law applies, a federal court may be required to determine if Oklahoma’s
process for Atkins claims constitutionally applies in a federal case or if a
new test must be crafted for Atkins appeals in federal cases.
If the decision is reversed, the Tenth Circuit most likely will again have
jurisdiction to weigh Murphy’s other issues on which it granted certificates
of appealability. While the Murphy v. Royal decision is a victory for
Murphy, it is not an exoneration. The decision speaks volumes to an issue
of jurisdiction raised by Murphy in only one of his appeals. It speaks not at
all to Atkins, which was raised in nearly all of Murphy’s appeals, nor to any
of the remaining issues in the case. Given the possibility that the Tenth
Circuit will again consider Murphy, the panel was derelict in its duty to
perform justice. Through their inaction, this panel may have extended the
circuitous path to justice and finality by several more years.
VI. Best Atkins Practices
Bright line rules seem a poor choice when determining an individual’s
capacity on a spectrum. While many states may impose an IQ number
above which a defendant cannot raise an Atkins claim, utilization of this
practice in most jurisdictions should not be conflated with ideal practices.
The risk is that two functionally identical individuals with very similar IQ
scores could be treated differently by the justice system because their IQ
scores fall on opposite sides of an arbitrary cutoff.
117. Curtis Killman, Experts: Court Ruling Overturning Native American Man’s Murder
Conviction, Death Penalty Could Have Huge Implications, TULSA WORLD (Aug. 8, 2017),
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/experts-court-ruling-overturning-native-americanman-s-murder-conviction/article_dd761b1d-2d9c-5542-8a50-771f2f92de85.html.
118. Federal Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.
org/federal-death-penalty (last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
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Supposing that two standard deviations on either side of the average may
account for ninety-five percent of a population, such a test will still exclude
one out of every twenty people. By allowing cutoff IQ scores in
determining mental capacity in capital cases, states may not be fully
complying with Atkins. In effect, states are saying that some margin of error
is acceptable. Necessarily some percentage of individuals lacking the
mental capacity to be executed will be barred from presenting evidence of
their capacity because they scored too high on a test.
A more constitutional metric would be to weigh IQ scores on a sliding
scale, giving greater weight to lower scores. Individuals whose test scores
indicate mental retardation would more easily be able to prove such
capacity. However, individuals who scored in borderline ranges would not
be prohibited from providing other evidence that suggests mental
retardation.
Additional constitutional concerns could be raised about defendants with
average or above average IQs who still might not understand the criminality
of their actions in narrow or specific areas. Likewise, individuals who did
not exhibit mental retardation in their development but suffered some
mental handicap in adulthood are not permitted to raise Atkins claims in
Oklahoma.119 Oklahoma requires that evidence of mental retardation be
exhibited and documented in an individual’s childhood or adolescence for
an Atkins claim. 120 In Oklahoma, age, like IQ scores, becomes an arbitrary
cutoff preventing individuals from pursuing Atkins claims simply because
mental retardation was first documented at eighteen instead of seventeen.
The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities sets criteria that courts may use to categorize and qualify
mental retardation. However, the association is not asked to gauge the
constitutionality of executing the mentally deficient or handicapped. A
broader carve out would better serve the constitutional due process rights of
individuals defending against capital cases. Ideally, IQ scores would be
persuasive but not dispositive, and there would be no requirement for
defendants to exhibit symptoms prior to adulthood. Perhaps such findings
from the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities should be compared to findings from the American Psychiatric
Association or the American Medical Association. A system that
incorporates mental retardation criteria into a larger general category of

119. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.10b (2011).
120. Id.
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defendants claiming incompetence to stand trial or unsuitability for the
death penalty would be best practice.
Conclusion
The issue of boundaries of Indian reservations for prosecutorial purposes
is worthwhile for federal courts to rule on, but it need not have been the
standalone issue in Murphy v. Royal. Circuit courts have minimal impact on
cases prior to reaching the appellate level. Once a ruling has been issued,
courts again have little determination over future outcomes on appeal.
When and where courts do have jurisdiction, they should use those
opportunities to work toward justice. In Murphy v. Royal, the Tenth Circuit
panel was well-versed in the facts leading to the appeal. The judges knew
the case had meandered for eighteen years already. While they might only
guess as to what will occur next, Murphy and some named Oklahoma
official may very well appear before the Tenth Circuit again in a few years.
Knowing this, the panel issued the narrowest possible ruling, kicking all
other cans down the road. In so doing, and with full knowledge that some
court may later have to determine the merits of these other seven appealable
issues, the panel has not done justice for Oklahoma, nor for Murphy, nor for
the surviving family of George Jacobs.
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